



MEMBERSHIP IN COMMUNIST PARTY WHICH
TERMINATED PRIOR TO ENTRY OF ALIEN GROUNDS
FOR DEPORTATION UNDER INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
OF 1950
An alien who had been a member of the Communist Party of
Canada from 1929 to 1932 was admitted to the United States for per-
manent residence in 1941. In 1947 deportation proceedings were insti-
tuted against him on the basis of his past Communist Party membership
and a final deportation order was issued in 1951. The alien sought
declaratory relief from the district court voiding the order, but this relief
was denied." The court of appeals affirmed, holding that under the
Internal Security Act of 19502 membership in the Communist Party of a
foreign country prior to entry was sufficient to sustain deportation. Klig v.
Browwll, 244 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. granted, 26 U.S.L. WEEYC
3105 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1957) (No. 143).
Congress' power to provide for the deportation of aliens which it
considers undesirable is plenary,3 subject only to the requirements of
procedural due process. 4 An alien seeking to remain in the United States
is afforded no protection by the Constitution's prohibition against ex
post facto penal legislation,5 since deportation is held to be neither a crim-
inal proceeding nor a punishment.6 Beginning with the Anarchist Act of
1918,7 Congress, by a series of enactments, including the Alien Registra-
tion Act of 1940,8 the Internal Security Act of 1950 9 and the Immigration
& Nationality Act of 1952 has provided for the exclusion and deportation
1. Instant case at 743.
2. Act of Sept. 23, 1950, c. 1024, § 22, 64 STAT. 1006.
3. See Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912) ; Lem Moon Sing v. United States,
158 U.S. 538 (1895) ; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
4. The alien is entitled to notice and the opportunity to present his case at a fair
hearing. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22
(1939) ; United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923). Since deporta-
tion proceedings are held to be civil rather than criminal he is not accorded the protec-
tion given the ordinary criminal defendant. See text and note at note 6 infra. Cf. text
and note at note 5 infra. No case has limited the substantive grounds upon which Con-
gress may provide for deportation of an alien.
5. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
6. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
7. C. 186, 40 STAT. 1012; see text and note at note 11 infrat
8. C. 439, 54 STAT. 670; see text and notes at notes 13-14 infra.
9. Act of Sept. 23, 1950, c. 1024, § 22, 64 STAT. 1006. See text and notes at notes
16-17 infra.
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of certain classes of subversive aliens. 10 The Anarchist Act of 1918 pro-
vided, inter alia, for the deportation of "any alien who, at any time after
entering the United States, is found to have been at the time of entry, or
to have become thereafter," a member of any organization that advocates
forceable overthrow of the United States Government." The Supreme
Court in Kessler v. Strecker 12 held that this act would not permit deporta-
tion of an alien who had been a member of a proscribed organization after
entry but had relinquished his membership prior to arrest. Shortly there-
after, the 1940 amendment to the act provided in section 1 for the exclu-
sion of "any alien who, at any time shall be or shall have been a member
of" certain designated classes.' 3 Section 2 provided for the deportation
of "any alien who was at the time of entering the United States, or has
been at any time thereafter, a member of any one of the classes of aliens
enumerated in section 1. . . ." 14 The Court, in construing these pro-
visions, has reached a different result from that reached in the Kessler case,
permitting the deportation of aliens who have been members of one of
the proscribed classes at or after entry but who have abandoned member-
ship prior to institution of proceedings.' 5 Whether these provisions permit
deportation in the event of a membership that had ceased prior to entry has
never been decided. A further revision in the law was effected by a 1950
amendment under which the proceedings in the instant case were instituted.
Section 1 of the amendment provided that "any alien who is a member of
any one of the following classes shall be excluded from admission into the
United States . . . (2) Aliens who, at any time, shall be or shall have
been members of any of the following classes . . . (C) Aliens who are
members of . . . (iv) the Communist . . . party . . . of any foreign
state . . . (H). ... ," 16 Section 4 (a) provides that "any alien who was
at the time of entering the United States, or has been at any time there-
after . . . a member of any one of the classes of aliens enumerated in . . .
section 1(2) of this Act, shall . . . be . . . deported. . .. " 17 In
Berrebi v. Crossman,18 the only case prior to the instant case to construe
10. 66 STAT. 195-217, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221-30, 1251-60 (1952). See text and notes
at notes 29-31 infra.
11. C. 186, § 2, 40 STAT. 1012. The act also provides for the exclusion of aliens who
have at any time been members of certain enumerated subversive classes.
12. 307 U.S. 22 (1939).
13. Alien Registration Act of 1940, c. 439, § 23(a), 54 STAT. 673.
14. Ibid. No new classes of excludable aliens were added by this amendment.
15. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
16. Act of Sept. 23, 1950, c. 1024, § 22, 64 STAT. 1006-07. To the classes enum-
erated in the 1940 amendment were added aliens who seek entry to engage in activities
endangering the public safety, aliens who are members of certain communist organi-
zations, aliens who advocate the doctrines of world communism, and aliens who are
members of organizations required to be registered with the Attorney General as sub-
versive.
17. Id. at 1008. All of these added excludable classes were subject to deportation
with the exception of those aliens who seek entry to engage in activities endangering
the public safety. Ibid.
18. 208 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1953).
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section 4(a), the circuit court held that the act did not provide for the
deportation of an alien who had been a member of the Communist Party
of a foreign state but had relinquished that membership prior to entry.
The instant court, in reaching the opposite result, concluded that the refer-
ence in 4(a) to "the classes of aliens enumerated in section 1(2)" requires
an inclusion of the time factor set forth in section 1(2) with each class
enumerated in subsections (A) through (H). 19
The instant statute is on its face ambiguous, since the "classes . .
enumerated in section 1(2)" reasonably could refer only to the enumera-
tion in subsections (A) through (H). Further, the legislative history
of the Internal Security Act is alone inconclusive. The House bill which
ultimately became the Internal Security Act originally contained no ex-
clusion or deportation provisions 20  After House enactment,21 the Senate,
by way of amendment, substituted its own security bill,2 2 part of which
contained the exclusion and deportation provisions. Senator McCarran,
the bill's sponsor, did not intimate that section 4(a) was intended to permit
deportation of aliens whose membership in subversive organizations had
ceased before entry.24 The final report of the conference committee stated
that "... in general, this provision [section 4(a)] covers those classes
of aliens who . . . are members of subversive organizations." 2 (Empha-
sis added.) The instant court relied on a Senate report published just
prior to the passage of the Internal Security Act of 195026 which recom-
mended that any alien who was a member of the Communist Party of any
country at any time should be excluded and if admitted should be de-
ported.2 7  This reliance appears misplaced since the report was not issued
nor discussed in connection with the Internal Security Act. The report
was in fact published as a result of a long term study of immigration
policy2 8 which subsequently culminated in the passage of the Immigration
& Nationality Act of 1952.29 That act evidently does not accept the pro-
posal of the report since it provides for deportation of aliens who were
19. Instant case at 746.
20. H.R. 9490, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
21. 96 CoNG. Rrc. 13770 (1950).
22. S. 4037, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
23. 96 CONG. tSc. 14628 (1950).
24. 96 CONG. R1c. 14179-80 (1950). The senator explained the "additional pro-
visions which would be incorporated in the present law." None of the provisions men-
tioned by him related to aliens whose communist membership had ceased before entry.
25. H.R. Risp. No. 3112, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1950).
26. S. RPb'. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
27. The language of the recommendation can also be read as applying only to
those aliens who would seek entry after enactment of the recommendation into statute.
28. The report was issued pursuant to S. REs. 137, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947),
which authorized the committee to conduct an extensive investigation pointing toward
a complete revision of the immigration laws.
29. Act of June 27, 1952, c. 477, 66 STA'T. 163 (codified in scattered sections of 5,
8, 18, 22, 31, 49 U.S.C.).
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excludable at the time of entry 3o and not those who subsequently would
have been excludable because of an amendment to the prior law, had they
then sought entry.31
While the legislative history of the 1950 amendment is inconclusive,
the legislative history of the Alien Registration Act of 1940, which contains
language virtually identical to that in the instant statute,3 2 sheds consider-
able light on the resolution of the problem. The House bill originally
provided for the deportation of aliens whose membership in a subversive
organization had terminated prior to entry,33 but this language was changed
by the Senate committee "to prevent hardship on aliens who may have,
in the distant past, but who had renounced before coming to the United
States, their membership in such classes" 34 and the final Senate report
stated that the act provided "that any alien who has been a member of such
classes at any time after his admission to the United States (for no matter
how short a time or how far in the past, so long as it was after the date of
entry), shall be deported." 35  (Emphasis added.)
Finally, the Supreme Court has held that deportation statutes are to be
strictly construed in favor of the alien. 6  Such a construction would appear
proper in view of the fact that deportation, while not a "punishment,"
imposes a severe penalty upon the alien 3 7 and may well, in the words of
Mr. Justice Cardozo, deprive him of "all that makes life worth living." 
38
Strict construction, moreover, cannot permanently affect the right of the
Government to deport an undesirable alien since Congress, if it so desires,
may give deportation provisions retroactive effect without regard to the
30. 66 STAT. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1952). The circuit court has construed "entry"
to mean any entry into the United States, whether initial, most recent, or intermediate.
Bonetti v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1956), petition for cert. filed, 25 U.S.L.
Wtic 3288 (U.S. March 25, 1957) (No. 854).
31. 66 STAT. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1952). The act also provides for deportation of
aliens who have been members of the Communist Party of any country after entering
the United States. The House and Senate reports, referring to the deportation section,
stated that "this class has been clarified to nuke it clear that aliens who are not ex-
cludable under the law existing at the time of entry because of past membership in
the proscribed classes are not to be deported solely because of such past member-
ship. ... (Emphasis added.) S. REP. No. 1137, pt. 1, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1952) ;
H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1952). This would seem to indicate that
S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), was given the interpretation set forth
in note 27 supra, rather than the interpretation of the instant court.
32. See text and notes at notes 13, 14, 16, 17 supra. Section 1 of the 1940 act
differs from section 1(2) of the 1950 act in only two respects. In the latter act several
new classes have been added and the clause providing for the exclusion of the classes
enumerated in the section has been relegated to a preceding paragraph. The clause re-
lating to time of membership, however, is identical in both acts.
33. H.R. 5138, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). The original language stated that Con-
gress intended that membership in any proscribed class "no matter how far in the past
should [prevent admission and) require deportation." H.R. REP. No. 994, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1939).
34. S. Rui,. No. 1721, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1940).
35. S. REP. No. 1796, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1940).
36. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948).
37. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
38. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
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Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.39  In light of these
factors, the instant court does not appear to have been justified in con-
struing an ambiguous provision against the alien.40
Criminal Law-
COUNTY SHERIFF COMPELLED TO RETURN
FINGERPRINTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN OF
TRAFFIC VIOLATOR CONFINED IN JAIL
Plaintiff was arrested for speeding, a non-indictable offense. Unable
to post bail, he was taken to the county jail where he was fingerprinted and
photographed. He later pleaded guilty to the charge and was fined. Sub-
sequently, plaintiff brought an action to compel the county sheriff to return
his photograph and fingerprints and to restrain distribution of them to
other law enforcement agencies.' The court, holding that the state statute
providing for the fingerprinting and photographing of "all persons confined
in any workhouse, jail, reformatory, penitentiary or other penal institu-
tion. . ." 2 applies only to persons confined for an indictable offense,8
ordered the sheriff to return plaintiff's fingerprints, photographs and other
records. Roesch v. Ferber, 45 N.J. Super. 149, 131 A.2d 807 (L. 1957).
In the absence of legislation courts have generally recognized that
police have authority to fingerprint and photograph prisoners upon their
arrest.4 However, most states, including New Jersey, have enacted legis-
39. See text and notes at notes 5-6 supra.
40. The Immigration & .Nationality Act repealed the Anarchist Act and all
amendments thereto. 66 STAT. 279, 8 U.S.C. § 137-2 (1952). A saving clause, however,
preserved the applicability of the prior legislation to aliens against whom proceedings
were instituted prior to December 24, 1952, the effective date of the act. 66 STAT. 280,
9 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952). It may be noted that the construction given the Internal Se-
curity Act in the instant case can affect only those aliens.
1. The data was distributed, however, to the FBI and the state police before the
trial. Since the state police were not a party to the suit, and since the FBI was not
under the jurisdiction of the court, the decision in the instant case was limited to the
Bergen County Sheriff.
2. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-14 (1955).
3. The court in the instant case argued that the crucial section of the statute, see
text at note 2 supra, must be read in conjunction with §§ 13 and 15 of the same statute.
Instant case at 152-53, 131 A.2d at 809-10. Section 13 provides: "The supervisor of the
state bureau of identification shall procure and file for record, fingerprints, plates,
photograplis, pictures, descriptions, measurements ... of all persons who have been or
may hereafter be convicted of an indictable offense. . ." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-13
(1955) ; section 15 requires that "[T]he sheriffs, chiefs of police, members of the State
Police and any other law enforcement agencies and officers, shall immediately upon the
arrest of any person for an indictable offense, or of any person believed to be wanted
for an indictable offense . . . take the fingerprints of such person ... " N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 53:1-15 (1955).
4. E.g., United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932) ; Shannon v. State, 207
Ark. 658, 182 S.W.2d 384 (1944) ; State ex rel. Bruns v. Clausmeier, 154 Ind. 599, 57
N.E. 541 (1900); Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 Atl. 653 (1909). The cases make
no distinction between arrests for a felony or a misdemeanor. E.g., United States
v. Kelly, supra; Bartletta v. McFeeley, 107 N.J. Eq. 141, 152 Atl. 17 (Ch. 1930).
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lation on the subject. Some of these statutes allow any prisoner to be
fingerprinted no matter what the charge against him,5 while others spe-
cifically forbid the fingerprinting and photographing of persons arrested for
minor violations." The majority of jurisdictions, however, make it the duty
of police officers to take identification data in certain situations, such as
when the prisoner is suspected of a felony, while either affirming nor deny-
ing their authority to act under other circumstances. 7 Some states have
placed statutory restrictions upon the use of these records. These restric-
tions may provide for the return of the prisoner's fingerprints, photographs
and other data upon his acquittal or, if no action is brought, upon his re-
lease.8  In addition, a number of jurisdictions have limited the use of this
data to law enforcement officers9
The interpretation given to the statute by the instant court is not de-
manded by its language.' 0 Since sections 13 and 15 include the words
"indictable offense," 11 the court concluded that the entire statute was
intended to apply only to persons arrested, confined for, or convicted of an
5. ALA. CoD ANN. tit. 54, § 38 (Supp. 1951); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-865 (Bums
1952) ; N.H. Rzv. STAT. ANN. c. 106:14, 593:1 to 3 (1955).
6. E.g., LA. RZV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1385 (1950); OHIo REv. Cons ANN. § 5149.06
(1954); VA. CoDS ANN. § 15-555.1 (Supp. 1956).
7. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 780e (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1956); MAss. ANN.
LAws c. 127, §§ 23-29 (1950) ; N.Y. CODS CRIM. PROC. § 940. The New Jersey statute,
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 53:1-13 to 53:1-15 (1955), would seem to fall into this category.
These statutes have sometimes been narrowly interpreted. See 1934 Ops. ATT'Y GEN.
452 (N.Y.); 1953 Ors. ATrT'v GEN. 189 (Mich.). Contra, Poyer v. Boustead, 3 Ill.
App. 2d 562, 122 N.E.2d 838 (1954) ; cf. People v. Les, 267 Mich. 648, 255 N.W. 407
(1934).
8. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 780e (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1956); N.Y. PEN.
LAw § 516; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1405 (c) (Purdon Supp. 1956) ; United States
v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932) (dictum). Other states have permitted the finger-
prints of discharged or acquitted persons to remain in police files. State ex rel. Mavity
v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E2d 755 (1946) ; Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 N.J. Eq. 9,
39 A.2d 851 (Ch. 1944) ; Hansson v. Harris, 252 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
9. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3658 (1949) ; Da. CoDS ANN. tit. 11, §§ 8511, 8518
(1953) ; MAss. ANN. LAws c. 127, § 29 (1950). Once the fingerprints and photographs
have been obtained they are usually sent to the local bureau of identification and to
other law enforcement agencies both within and without the state. E.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 53:1-13 to 53:1-15 (1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 780c (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1956) ; MAss. ANN. LAws c. 127, § 28 (Supp. 1956). The bureau of identification
maintains this data in criminal files which are kept apart from those containing data
taken voluntarily for non-criminal purposes. See MICH. STAT. ANN § 4.482 (1950) ;
DEL. CoDS ANN. tit. 11, § 8510 (1953); VT. LAws, 1949no. 240. See also Comment, 33
CHr.-KENT L. REv. 276, 277 (1955); American City, May 1935, p. 15, pointing
out that the Federal Bureau of Identification keeps separate identification files, one
of which is for the storage of criminal fingerprints and the others for non-criminal
data. See also BROWNE & BROCK, FINGERPRINTS 184 (1953). The primary purpose
of keeping fingerprint files is for storage of criminal records. See Hoover, International
Exchange of Fingerprints, 24 J. CRIA. L., C. & P.S. 664 (1933). Since there is no
clear statutory authority for placing photographs in rogues' galleries, whether photo-
graphs taken upon arrest will be used in such a manner seems to be a matter of police
discretion. In the instant case, plaintiff's fingerprints were kept in a criminal file and his
photographs in a rogues' gallery. Letter from I. William Aronsohn, counsel for plain-
tiff in the instant case, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Oct. 15, 1957,
on file in Biddle Law Library.
10. See Poyer v. Boustead, 3 Ill. App. 2d 562, 122 N.E.2d 838 (1954), where
the court, interpreting an Illinois statute similar to the one in issue in the instant case,
arrived at an opposite result.
11. See note 3 supra.
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indictable offense, and not under any circumstances to traffic violators.' 2
But it would seem that the exclusion of the word "indictable" from section
14 13 indicates a legislative intention to include persons confined for non-
indictable offenses, and the reference to ". . . all persons confined in
any . . . jail. . " 14 is consistent with a broad interpretation of the
section in question. In addition, the purpose of the act appears to be the
acquisition for central filing of as many fingerprints as possible 15 and any
restriction on this purpose should be cautiously applied.16 Since the
statute is open to more than one interpretation, an attempt may be made
to remove its ambiguity by balancing the interests of traffic violators in
regaining identification data with those of law enforcement agencies in
their taking and retention.
Fingerprints have long served as a valuable aid to the detection of
crime.17 They may also be used as a means of identification in detention
centers and penal institutions,' 8 and in identifying unknown dead or the
victims of amnesia. 19 Naturally, the greater the number of fingerprints on
file, the more likely it is that the file will be of assistance in specific instances.
Compulsory fingerprinting for all persons has been suggested by some as
the logical outgrowth of this principle, but has not been accepted by demo-
cratic societies.20  The reasons which militate against compulsory finger-
printing, however, are not so compelling if fingerprinting is required only
of those who have sufficient contact with law enforcement authorities as
to warrant some form of detention. Fingerprinting of those individuals
not only adds to the file, thereby making it more useful, but also provides
a means of establishing the status of the individual is 4 vis other enforce-
12. Instant case at 152, 131 A.2d at 809.
13. See text at note 2 supra.
14. Ibid.
15. The act in question is entitled "An act to create a State Bureau of Identifica-
tion within the Department of State Police and requiring peace officers, persons in
charge of certain State institutions and others to make reports respecting criminals
to such bureau, and to provide a penalty for violation of the provisions thereof." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 53:1-12 (1955).
16. Section 14 refers to "... workhouses, jails, reformatories, penitentiaries or
other institutions ... ." It is not clear whether "jails" refers to places of detention
where prisoners are kept prior to trial or whether it is to be considered ejusdem
generis with the other institutions as a place of confinement for convicted persons.
However, since the legislature used the work "convicted" in § 13, it would seem rea-
sonable that they would have included it in § 14 had they intended the latter interpre-
tation.
17. See Moffat, Taking Finger Prints Upon Arrest, 12 A.B.A.J. 175, 176 (1926).
18. Ibid. The chance of an escape by a dangerous criminal who was clever enough
to pose as another prisoner about to be released on bail would be significantly reduced
by checking fingerprints made upon release with those made when the person was
taken into custody. Thus, prison officials would not be forced to rely on their own
memory or on questions posed to the person to be released, the answers to which
could have been obtained during the time of detention.
19. See BROWNE & BROCK, FINGERPRINTS 184-87, 210 (1953); Kidd, The Right
To Take Fingerprints, Measurements, and Photographs, 8 C.A~i. L. Rz. 25, 38-40
(1919).
20. See Valentine and Ernst, Should We Have Universal Fingerprinting?, 100
TH FoRumt 171 (1938).
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ment bodies. If a traffic offender, for example, is "wanted" by law
enforcement authorities in the same or other jurisdictions, this fact will
be revealed in the central bureau of identification.2 ' In view of these
benefits, only some measurable detriment to the individual should justify
denying police and prison officials the right to take and retain fingerprints
of traffic violators. The instant plaintiff contended that such retention
would result in embarrassment and might present future difficulties.
22
However, since fingerprint records include a description of the offense with
which the individual has been chargedas it is difficult to see what prejudice
could arise from the inclusion of the prints of a traffic violator in any
fingerprint file.
2 4
To some extent photographs serve the same functions as fingerprints.
They are used extensively as a means of quick identification. 25 However,
a photograph in a rogues' gallery, carries a chance of prejudice to the
traffic violator which is absent in the case of fingerprints. It might, for
example, be viewed by an acquaintance of the individual; or, because of
the vagaries of this method of identification, it might cause the individual
to be erroneously accused of a crime, thereby not only causing embarrass-
ment, but also putting him to the trouble of explaining his activities to
remove the doubt caused by the mistaken identification 2 6 Therefore, it
would seem that contact with such photographs by individuals other than
police and detention officials should be prohibited. The only completely
effective way to achieve this result is to prohibit photographing the traffic
violator. In the instant case the New Jersey statute was so worded as to
require the court either to permit the fingerprinting and photographing
or to deny both.2 7  Faced with only these alternatives, the court's decision
is a practical solution to the problem. However, a better result would be
to permit the taking of fingerprints, while denying this right with respect
to photographs. In view of the statute, this result could be obtained only
by legislative action.
21. The process of comparing the fingerprints of a person taken into custody
with those contained in criminal files is a matter of a few moments. See Moffat,
Taking Finger Prints Upon Arrest, 12 A.B.A.J. 175, 176 (1926).
22. The plaintiff in the instant case was a pre-law student and feared that the
presence of his fingerprints in the criminal files would be prejudicial when he applied
for admission to the New York Bar. Instant case at 150, 131 A.2d at 808.
23. See note 9 supra.
24. Many millions of persons have been fingerprinted for non-criminal purposes.
These fingerprints are kept on file. BROWNE & BROcx, FINGERPRINTS 184 (1953).
Some identification centers keep those prints in the same file as criminal prints. See
New York Times Magazine, April 18, 1954, p. 62, while other centers, such as the
FBI identification center, keep them separated. See note 9 supra.
25. See Identification by Photograph, 74 L.J. 326 (1932).
26. Some courts have granted injunctions prohibiting such display before con-
viction. Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905), aff'd, 117 La. 708, 42
So. 228 (1906); Schulman v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737 (1905), aff'd, 117
La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906); Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 Atl. 653 (1909) (dic-
tum).
27. See text at note 2 supra.
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Evidence-
RECORDING OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN ATTORNEY
AND CLIENT MADE IN COUNTY PRISON WITHOUT
CONVERSANTS' KNOWLEDGE HELD ADMISSIBLE
IN LEGISLATIVE HEARING
Prison authorities surreptitiously recorded by electronic device a con-
ference between an attorney 1 and his client in the counsel room of the
Westchester County Jail,2 where the client was being detained as a parole
violator. Subsequently, a New York state legislative committee investi-
gating parole violations announced that it would introduce the recording
in evidence at a public hearing.3 The client sought an injunction against
the use of the recording by the committee on the ground, inter alia, that
such a use would violate the statutory attorney-client privilege.4  The
special term granted an injunction pendente lite restraining publication
of the recording,5 but the appellate division reversed.6 The Court of
Appeals affirmed the reversal, holding disclosure to be within the eaves-
dropper exception to the privilege.7 Lanza v. New York State Legislative
Comm., 3 N.Y.2d 92, 164 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1957), cert. denied, 26 U.S.L.
WEEK 3129 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1957) (No. 377).
Delineation of the scope of the attorney-client privilege must balance
the need for confidential communication between the attorney and his
client with the effect of a denial to a fact-finding body of information rele-
vant to its inquiry.8 Despite the risk of suppression of information neces-
1. The existence of an attorney-client relationship was contested; however, since
plaintiff's petition was challenged by a motion to dismiss for legal 'insufficiency, the
allegations of the petition must be assumed to be true. Denihan Enterprises, Inc. v.
O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 451, 458, 99 N.E2d 235, 238 (1951).
2. The "counsel room" was assigned by the prison officials to the attorney after
the latter signed the counsel book, thereby indicating the purpose of his visit. No
third person was in the counsel room at the time the attorney and the client con-
versed. Brief for Respondents, p. 9, Lanza v. New York State Legislative Comm., 3
App. Div. 2d 531, 162 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1st Dep't 1957).
3. Judge Desmond in his dissent indicates that the eavesdropping was done by
"officials of Westchester County." Instant case at 10, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 16. The opin-
ions are silent as to the part played in the eavesdropping by the legislative committee
and the means by which they acquired the recordings.
4. N.Y. CivW PRACT'IC AcT § 353. Such statutes are usually considered declara-
tory of the common law. Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 128 N.Y. 420, 28 N.E. 651 (1891) ; 8
WIGMBOa, EVIDSCE § 2292 (3d ed. 1940).
5. Lanza v. New York State Legislative Comm., 5 Misc. 2d 324, 164 N.Y.S.2d
531 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
6. Lanza v. New York State Legislative Comm., 3 App. Div. 2d 531, 162 N.Y.S.2d
467 (1st Dep't 1957).
7. The complaint also averred that the use of the recording would constitute an
unconstitutional denial of the right to counsel. The court dismissed this contention on
the grounds, inter alia, that while the act of recording may have been unconstitutional
and would vitiate a judicial proceeding, the proposed use of the recording in a legis-
lative investigation was not unconstitutional. Instant case at 98, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 13. A
further issue which the court considered was whether or not it had the power to
enioin the legislature in this case. The court concluded that it did not. Instant case
at 99-100, 164 N.Y.S.2d at I5. For a discussion of this issue in the case, see Comment,
43 VA. L. Rrv. 955 (1957).
8. See Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir.), aff'd, 339 U.S.
974 (1950); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D.
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sary to intelligent factual determinations, courts have universally recognized
the attorney-client privilege in judicial proceedings. 9 While few cases
have been concerned with the validity of this or other confidential com-
munication privileges in legislative investigations, those jurisdictions that
have been confronted with the issue, including New York in which the
instant case arose, have recognized their applicability to such proceedings. 10
The attorney-client privilege permanently protects a person seeking legal
advice from disclosure of confidential communications between himself
and a professional legal advisor acting in that capacity,-" except where the
protection is waived.'2 But the privilege can be invoked only to prevent
testimonial compulsion of the client,' 3 his attorney,14 and their agents who
necessarily have been exposed to the communication. 1 Persons other than
these who overhear the privileged conversation can be compelled to testify
under the common-law eavesdropper exception. 6 The traditional justifica-
Mass. 1950) ; City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227,
234, 231 P.2d 26, 29 (1951).'The deterrence to the search for truth produced by a
recognition of the privilege leads some to the conclusion that it should be abolished.
Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer ad Client, 16
Cmar. L. Rzv. 487 (1928). But see 8 WIomoRx, EViD4Ncx § 2291 (3d ed. 1940).
9. Thirteen states and the District of Columbia retain the attorney-client privilege
as part of the common law. See, e.g., Shelley v. Landry, 97 N.H. 27, 79 A2d 626
(1951) ; in re Selser, 15 N.J. 393, 105 A.2d 395 (1954) ; Drayton v. Industrial Life
and Health Ins. Co., 205 S.C. 98, 31 S.E.2d 148 (1944). In all other states the privi-
lege has been embodied in statutes. Statutes are collected in 8 WiMoM, EviDNCX
§ 2292 n.2 (3d ed. 1940).
10. New York City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940)
(statutory physician-patient privilege enacted simultaneously with the attorney-client
privilege); Sullivan v. Hill, 73 W. Va. 49 (1913) (attorney-client privilege) (dic-
tum). Recognition of the privilege in legislative hearings has the approval of the
authorities. See 1 WIGMo, EVIDENCS § 4c, at 94 (3d ed. 1940) ; Hamilton, The In-
quisitorial Power of Congress, 23 A.B.A.J. 511, 516 (1937) ; Maslow, Fair Procedure
in Congressional Investigation,, 54 COLum. L. REv. 839, 873 (1954); Comment, 46
CAuF. L. REv. (1957). No federal court has decided the issue, though several
courts have assumed that privileges are to be observed by legislative or administrative
bodies in deciding that the proponent of the privilege did not fall within its protec-
tion. In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953);
McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1937) ; United States v. Keeney, 111 F. Supp.
233 (D.D.C. 1953); SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1948).
11. Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1950) ; Palatini v. Sarian, 15
N.J. Super. 34, 83 A2d 24 (App. Div. 1951). The protection extends not just to legal
advice procured pursuant to a legal proceeding but to legal advice given under any cir-
cumstances. Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353, 358 (1891) ; Foster v. Hall, 29
Mass. (12 Pick.) 89, 98 (1831).
12. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888). The privilege is the client's, not
the attorney's, though the attorney may be incidentally protected from testimonial
compulsion unless his client waives the privilege. See Abbott v. Superior Court, 78
Cal. App. 2d 19, 21, 177 P2d 317, 318 (1947) ; State v. Toscano, 13 N.J. 418, 424, 100
A.2d 170, 172 (1953).
13. In re Turner, 51 F. Supp. 740, 743 (W.D. Ky. 1943); Birmingham Ry. &
Elec. Co. v. Wildman, 119 Ala. 547, 24 So. 548 (1898).
14. In re Reuter, 4 App. Div. 2d 252, 164 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1st Dep't 1957). This
case was a later development of the instant case; the legislative committee attempted
to elicit, from the attorney, information collateral to the recording at issue in the
instant case. The court refused to hold the attorney in contempt for his refusal to
answer, upholding his contention of privilege.
15. Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942); Schubkagel v.
Dierstein, 131 Pa. 46, 18 Atl. 1059 (1890).
16. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir. 1949); Hoy v.
Morris, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 519 (1859). The eavesdropper exception applies also to the
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tion for this exception is that the harm to the administration of justice
from suppressing relevant evidence 17 is not warranted in such a situation,
first, "since the means of preserving secrecy of communication are entirely
in the client's hands, and [second] since the privilege is a derogation from
the general testimonial duty and should be strictly construed . ,, .s The
fact that the eavesdropper is a law enforcement official does not affect the
applicability of the eavesdropper exception,1 9 whether the eavesdropping
be by accident or design.2 0 Nor has the fact that the eavesdropping was
by electronic device affected the result.2 ' The instant case is unique in per-
mitting disclosure of statements electronically overheard in a prison counsel
room where of necessity the prisoner-client must conduct interviews with
his attorney.
Electronic eavesdropping devices are designed to operate .where they
will be expected least and can be installed in ways making their detection
virtually impossible 22  Thus, though the propriety of burdening conferees
with the obligation of guarding their conversations against eavesdropping
be assumed,2 sanctioning these devices greatly increases the burden. The
Uniform Rules of Evidence suggest, as a limitation upon the exception, that
the attorney and his client be required to guard against that eavesdropping
which can be reasonably anticipated.2 4 If use of electronic eavesdrop-
physician-patient privilege; Iwerks v. People, 108 Colo. 556, 560, 120 P.2d 961, 963
(1942) ; and the husband-wife privilege; Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567,
120 N.E. 209 (1918).
17. The justification for the eavesdropper exception is oriented to judicial pro-
ceedings because of the paucity of cases concerning the application of the privilege
to legislative investigations. However, there may be a need to re-evaluate the justifi-
cation with regard to legislative bodies. See Comment, 46 CALiF. L. Rzv. (1957).
18. 8 WIGMoaz, EvmsINCZ § 2326 (3d ed. 1940).
19. Cotton v. State, 87 Ala. 75, 6 So. 396 (1888); State v. Falsetta, 43 Wash.
159, 86 Pac. 168 (1906); see also United States ex teL Cooper v. Denno, 221 F.2d
626 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 968 (1955).
20. Commonwealth v. Griffin, 110 Mass. 181 (1872) (husband-wife privilege);
State v. Falsetta, 43 Wash. 159, 86 Pac. 168 (1906) (dictum); see United States
ex rel. Cooper v. Denno, 221 F.2d 626. (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 968 (1955).
Where one fraudulently pretends to be the attorney of a prisoner for the purpose of
securing his admissions, the conversation has been held privileged. State v. Russell,
83 Wis. 330, 53 N.W. 441 (1892) ; but there is a split of authority as to whether the
eavesdropper exception applies to such a case. People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277, 27
N.W. 539 (1836) (yes); Rex. v. Choney, 13 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 289 (1908) (no,
holding that the eavesdropper was the agent of the false attorney).
21. Erhlich v. Erhlich, 278 App. Div. 244, 104 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dep't 1951)
(wiretap); Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339, modified on denial of
rehearing, 159 Tex. Crim. 195, 261 S.W.2d 344 (1953) (long-distance telephone opera-
tor). For cases to the same effect involving the husband-wife privilege, see Common-
wealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 120 N.E. 209 (1918) (dictograph); Hunter v.
Hunter, 169 Pa. Super. 498, 83 A.2d 401 (1951) (wire recorder).
22. For factual situations indicating the secretive nature of this practice, see
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952).
23. The burden of preserving secrecy heretofore has been imposed absolutely
on the communicants, except where the client makes admissions to one falsely repre-
senting himself as the client's attorney. See note 20 supra.
24. "... communications between lawyer and his client . . . in professional con-
fidence, are privileged and a client has a privilege . . . (c) to prevent any other wit-
ness from disclosing such communication if it came to the knowledge of such wit-
ness . . . (ii) in a manner not reasonably to be anticipated by the client... ." UrN-
FORm RULEs or EvmsNca rule 26.
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ping is not widespread, this limitation might serve to prevent disclosure
of statements obtained thereby.2 But once the method becomes common-
place to the point where it would be unreasonable not to anticipate it, this
limitation affords little protection. One means of avoiding detection is to
shift the conference to a place unlikely to be under surveillance; so long
as the attorney and client have mobility this burden may not be too harsh.
When, however, the attorney-client conference must take place, if at
all, in a prison counsel room, sanctioning of electronic eavesdropping
vitiates the privilege with the result that in a substantial number of cases
the client may be deterred from communicating freely with his attorney.20
Since the client's need for counsel is strongest during the pendency of liti-
gation, particularly if that litigation is criminal in nature,27 this result seems
inconsistent with the legislative grant of the privilege.28
Of greater significance, the practice of eavesdropping on a prison coun-
sel room may deny a prisoner due process and deprive him of his right to
counsel.29 The instant court conceded "that if such interference had
occured in connection with a proceeding directed against [the client], any
resulting determination would be annulled by the courts on the ground
that the interference with his right to counsel had destroyed his consti-
25. In the instant case, had New York recognized the Uniform Rules approach,
Lanza might have argued that he could not have reasonably anticipated electronic
eavesdropping in the counsel room.
26. The justification for the eavesdropper exception, see text at note 17 supra,
indicates that the factual situation in the instant case does not warrant its application.
The doctrine that the privilege should be strictly construed cannot be determinative
of the scope of the privilege as it affords no criterion for distinguishing among
situations, and is no more than a caveat to weigh competing interests. The other
justification, i.e., that the means of preserving secrecy are in the hands of the client,
is inapplicable where, as in this case, the means of preserving secrecy were in fact
not in the hands of the client.
27. That this destruction of the privilege through a police trick is unfair was
recognized in Rex v. Choney, 13 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 289 (1908). An interpreter
represented himself to a non-English speaking prisoner as an agent of the prisoner's
attorney. This was a plot of the prosecutor to secure evidence, and two eavesdroppers
were in the adjoining cell for that purpose. The court held that the privilege applied
to the interpreter, adopting the fiction that the interpreter was the agent of the attor-
ney. As to the eavesdroppers, the court held that they also must be treated as agents
of the prisoner's attorney since they were involved in the same scheme as the inter-
preter. Professor McCormick also recognizes the helplessness of the prisoner in jail;
see note 28 infra.
28. Professor McCormick, in speaking of the husband-wife privilege, says: "But
if a prisoner in jail speaks to his wife with all the secrecy that his poor cell affords,
it seems unduly harsh to forfeit the privilege if by wire-recorder or by eavesdroppers
in the next cell his confidences are overheard." McCoRmIcK, EvIDNCNa § 86 (1954).
This statement would seem to apply with equal force to the attorney-client privilege,
and it seems that McCormick considers the matter in a section concerned with the
husband-wife privilege only because that was the sole context in which the issue
has arisen prior to the instant case. See Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567,
120 N.E. 209 (1918).
29. For cases holding that eavesdropping on the attorney-client conversations
pursuant to a criminal proceeding is a violation of due process under the fifth amend-
ment and the right to counsel under the sixth amendment, see Caldwell v. United
States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C.
Cir. 1951): cf. Ellis v. State. 149 Tex. Crim. 583, 197 S.W.2d 351 (1946).
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tutional right to a fair trial." 30 However, it determined that the use
of the recording in a legislative investigation was proper, since the pro-
ceedings were not directed against the client and the findings of the
investigation would not be binding on any of the client's rights.&31 Even
though detected attorney-client communications may not be used in a
prosecution against the client, publication will nevertheless operate to re-
strain future confidential communications.32 Denial of disclosure would
deprive the legislature of relevant information. However, the gravity of
this denial is ameliorated by the fact that legislative committees can
make full utilization of paid investigators, and are not limited by rules
governing the admissibility of evidence as are courts. Furthermore,
committees formulating legislative policies need not be as concerned with
the activities of a particular individual, as is a judicial inquiry.p The
prospective injury to the attorney-client communications, when viewed in
the light of the limited injury to the legislature, should yield a result con-
sistent with deterrence of the practice of secret detection. Introduction of
the recorded conversation in a legislative hearing can only operate to en-
courage this practice. The alternative of denying its use, which would
operate as a deterrent to detection and as a stimulant to confidential com-
munication, would appear more desirable.34
Joint Tortfeasors-
RELEASED TORTFEASOR REQUIRED TO REMAIN AS
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT FOR PURPOSE OF
DETERMINING REDUCTION OF ORIGINAL
DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY
Plaintiff brought an action for damages against the driver of the
car in which she was a passenger for injuries resulting from a two car
30. "Of course, we agree with the courts below that the secret recording of the
conversations in the manner alleged in the complaint was an unreasonable interference
with Lanza's right to confer privately with counsel." Instant case at 98, 164 N.Y.S.2d
at 13.
31. Id. at 99, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
32. A New York court felt it necessary to release a prisoner held without bail
into the custody of his attorney to protect his right of counsel. The court, referring
to the instant case, said: "I became convinced by what was said by counsel that there
was a necessity of permitting defendants outside the Tombs for the purpose of
free consultation. . . . I have an idea that the recent problem that has arisen through
somebody putting a tape recording machine in these places [prisons] leads counsel
to believe every one of these places is tape recorded." N.Y. Times, June 26, 1957,
p. 64, col. 1.
33. Comment, 46 CAIp. L. Rxv. (1957).
34. A recent New York statute has rendered all evidence obtained by eavesdrop-
ping inadmissible in civil proceedings. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 880, § 1. This pro-
vision took effect on July 1, 1957. Although its effective date was subsequent to that
of the instant case, the fact that such a statute had been enacted at the time of this
decision may have influenced the court in that the instant decision could in no way
serve as a precedent in civil cases. This might be a consideration in appraising the
precedent value of the case for other jurisdictions.
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collision. Defendant denied liability and impleaded 1 the driver of the other
car as a third party defendant for contribution under the Uniform Con-
tribution Among Tortfeasors Act.2 Third party defendant pleaded a re-
lease, admitted by plaintiff, which provided for a pro rata reduction of
plaintiff's claim, sufficient under the act to relieve the third party defendant
of liability for contribution to the original defendant. Third party defendant
then moved for summary judgment to have himself dismissed from the
action. The trial court granted the motion but was reversed on appeal.
The appellate court conceded that the release was valid and effective to
deny the original defendant any claim for contribution from the third party
defendant. 4 Nevertheless, the court held that any reduction in the original
defendant's liability under the act depended upon his showing that the
third party defendant was in fact a tortfeasor and that the third party
defendant could not be dismissed from the action. Swigert v. Welk, 133
A.2d 428 (Md. 1957).
The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act is designed to
effect an equitable distribution of responsibility among those whose negli-
gence makes them jointly liable for an injury to another person.? The
act provides that release of one tortfeasor does not extinguish the injured
party's right against other joint tortfeasors unless the release so provides.
6
However, the injured party's claim against other tortfeasors is reduced by
the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or by any amount or
proportion that the release provides, if such amount or proportion is
greater than the consideration paid.7  The act further provides for con-
tribution among joint tortfeasors.8  A released tortfeasor is not relieved
1. MD. ANN. CODn rule 315(a) (1957).
2. 9 UNIFORM LAws ANNO'rATFD 153 (1951) (hereinafter cited as UNIFORM
AcT), enacted in Maryland as MD. ANN. CODS art. 50, §§ 20-26 (1951). The Uniform
Act has been adopted in Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, New Mexico, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island and South Dakota. The Maryland statute omits § 2(4) of the
Uniform Act which provides for comparative degrees of fault. MD. ANN. CODS; art.
50, § 21 (1951).
3. UNIFORa AcT § 5.
4. Instant case at 433.
5. At common law -there is generally no right of contribution among joint tort-
feasors. Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905). But
statutes in many jurisdictions now permit the enforcement of contribution among joint
tortfeasors. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A :53A-2 (1952). At common law release of one
of several joint tortfeasors discharges all. Rushford v. United States, 204 F.2d 831
(2d Cir. 1953). This rule has largely given way to statutes preserving the injured
party's right of action against joint tortfeasors not party to the release, e.g., N.Y.
DBWOR & CasmToR LAW §§ 231-40, and to the device of a covenant not to sue, an
instrument in which the injured person does not surrender his cause of action, but
merely covenants that he will not bring such an action against this tortfeasor. The
covenant does not release other tortfeasors. E.g., Daniels v. Celeste, 303 Mass.
148, 21 N.E.2d 1 (1939) (dictum).
6. UNIFORM AcT § 4.
7. Ibid. For example, an injured person releases one of two joint tortfeasors for
a consideration of $2,000, the release providing that all claims against this tortfeasor
are released, and that all claims against others are reduced to the extent of his pro
rata share (which is half the total damages, there being two tortfeasors). In a sub-
sequent action against the other tortfeasor, if plaintiff's total damages are determined
to be $3,000, his claim against the second tortfeasor will be reduced to $1,000. If the
total damages are $8,000, his claim against the second tortfeasor will be reduced to
$4,000.
8. Id. § 2.
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of liability to a joint tortfeasor for contribution unless the release "provides
for a reduction to the extent of the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor,
of the injured person's damages recoverable against all other tortfeasors." 9
Maryland, the instant jurisdiction,10 and Pennsylvania:" hold that under
the act a defendant can obtain a reduction in the amount recoverable
against him-either of a pro rata share of the total damages recoverable or
of the amount of consideration paid for the release-only by proving that
the person released was in fact a joint tortfeasor. Should plaintiff be un-
willing to consent 12 to a reduction of his claim, it was held in Davis v.
Miller,13 as in the instant case that the released tortfeasor may be required
by the defendant to remain as a party for the purpose of determining his
status as a joint torffeasor.14
In allowing reduction only where the released person is in fact a joint
tortfeasor, the Maryland and Pennsylvania courts differ from the majority
of jurisdictions which hold that payment for a release by one person will
reduce pro tanto the injured person's claim against another, whether or
not the released person was in fact a joint tortfeasor.15 The majority
position rests on the theory that there may be but one satisfaction for the
injury, and to allow full recovery where there has already been partial
satisfaction is to unjustly enrich the plaintiff. However, so long as the
instant jurisdiction persists in adhering to its contrary view the issue of
the negligence of the released party will have to be litigated where plaintiff
will not consent to the reduction.'6
If proof of the released person's negligence be required, the court must
then decide whether to make such a determination with or without reten-
tion of the released person as a party to the action. In concluding that the
released person must remain a party, the instant court opined that "it
would create a somewhat incongruous procedural situation to have a party
9. Id. § 5. If the release provides for no reduction of the total claim, or only for
reduction to the extent of the consideration paid, the released person is still liable for
contribution to another tortfeasor subsequently held liable for the injury.
10. Zaccari v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 50 (D. Md. 1955); instant case at
431, citing Maryland Lumber Co. v. White, 205 Md. 180, 107 A.2d 73 (1954).
11. Davis v. Miller, 385 Pa. 348, 352, 123 A.2d 422, 424 (1956) ; Koller v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 351 Pa. 60, 40 A.2d 89 (1944).
12. The release given the third party defendant by plaintiff and confirmed in her
admissions of fact provided for a reduction of her claim to the extent of the released
person's statutory pro rata share, but did not provide for a pro tanto reduction in the
amount of the consideration paid for the release, should this be greater. Since the
instant court requires a showing that the released person was in fact a tortfeasor
before either a pro tanto or pro' rata reduction will be applied, it appears the court
did not consider plaintiff's admission of the release providing for a pro rata reduction
as constituting consent to a pro rata reduction (or, of course, a pro tanto reduction).
13. 385 Pa. 348, 123 A.2d 422 (1956).
14. In Killian v. Cantanese, 375 Pa. 593, 101 A.Zd 379 (1954), the impleaded tort-
feasor was granted judgment on the pleadings because he had been released by the
original defendant, but not by the plaintiff, thus eliminating any possibility of contri-
bution or reduction of plaintiff's claim against original defendant. In Fleck v. Marzano,
108 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1952), plaintiff was permitted to dismiss her action against
a tortfeasor whom she had released, reserving her right to continue against the other,
the court requiring her to file as a matter of record the release which complied with
the provisions of the Uniform Act.
15. E.g., Holland v. Southern Pac. Util. Co., 208 N.C. 289, 180 S.E. 592 (1935).
See Paossma, ToRTs 246 (2d ed. 1955).
16. See note 13 supra.
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to a case completely dismissed and leave the question of his negligence
yet to be determined." 17 Such reasoning is not persuasive. In other
areas of the law the issue of a person's negligence can be litigated without
his being made a party to the action. Thus, a defendant, without joining a
third party, is permitted to show that his own negligent acts were not the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury by proving that the cause was the
intervening negligence of a third person.' 8 Similarly, in an action against
a master the negligence of a servant may be litigated without his joinder.19
Since the act itself does not provide a procedure for enforcing the rights
which it establishes, joinder of parties must be governed by the juris-
diction's rules of civil procedure 20 Permissive joinder of parties is a pro-
cedural device designed to avoid piecemeal determination of the rights of
various persons arising out of a single transaction or occurrence. 21 Where
it appears that the rights of the third party defendant and those of the
other parties to the controversy are no longer dependent upon the retention
of the third party defendant as a party to the judgment, he should be dis-
missed from the action and not made to bear further inconvenience and
expense. Thus, under the facts of the instant case, once the validity of the
release was established its terms prevented the third party defendant from
being liable either to the plaintiff or to the original defendant, 22 and sum-
mary judgment should have been granted. Furthermore, the result of the
instant decision would seem to discourage settlement of claims, contrary
to the policy 2 of the act. Since one incentive to settlement is avoidance
of the expense and inconvenience of a lawsuit, retaining a released person
as a party to the action for longer than necessary can only operate to
frustrate this policy.
Wiretapping-
EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH WIRETAPPING BY
STATE OFFICERS ADMITTED IN FEDERAL
PROSECUTION
The New York City police, acting in accordance with New York
law,' obtained a warrant to tap a telephone used by defendant. Defendant's
tapped conversations led police to believe that defendant was transporting
17. Instant case at 433. This statement would seem to suggest that the court
believes the issue of the third party's negligence will be more effectively litigated if
he remains as a party. It seems doubtful whether this issue will be contested at all, or
of what value the presence as a 'party of a person with no interest in the outcome of
the action will be even if it should be contested.
18. E.g., Caulder v. Gresham, 224 N.C. 402, 30 S.E.2d 312 (1944).
19. MncHzm, AGnScY § 405 (4th ed. 1952). In some jurisdictions the servant
may not be joined.
20. See note 1 supra.
21. CLARK, Cots PLSADING 382 (2d ed. 1947).
22. See note 4 supra.
23. UNiFoRm AcT § 4, comment b, at 10 (1955).
1. N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 12; N.Y. CoDt CGIm. PRoc. § 813-a.
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narcotics in violation of state law. On the basis of this information, police
stopped and searched a car believed to be carrying narcotics. The car
carried no narcotics; instead, police found untaxed alcohol in violation of
federal law.2 City police officials notified the federal government and a
federal prosecution followed, but not until the trial did the federal au-
thorities learn that a wire tap had been used. A motion to suppress the
alcohol evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation of section
605 of the Federal Communications Act was denied.3 The circuit court
affirmed defendant's conviction, holding that evidence obtained by state
officers as a result of wiretapping in violation of the federal statute, without
the participation or collusion of federal officials, is admissible in federal
courts. United States v. Benanti, 244 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
granted, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3115 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1957) (No. 31).
The Supreme Court, in Olmstead v. United States,4 held that intercep-
tion of a telephone communication was not an unconstitutional search and
seizure on the ground that no search and seizure had been effected.5 Con-
gress subsequently enacted the Federal Communications Act 
6 section 605 7
which prohibits any person,8 not authorized by the sender, 9 from inter-
cepting and divulging any communication by a wire tap.10 The proscription
applies to intrastate 1 as well as interstate 12 communications, and covers
conduct by law enforcement officials, both federal 1'3 and state.'4 Al-
though unlawful interception of a telephone communication is not an
2. IN T. Riv. CoD4 or 1954, §§ 5008(b) (1), 5642.
3. Instant case at 391.
4. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
5. Wires for the tap were inserted along the telephone lines leading from the
defendants' premises and the taps were conductd without trespass upon their prop-
erty. Id. at 457. The Court concluded that this wiretapping did not amount to a search
and seizure. Id. at 466. Four Justices dissented, claiming first that the wire tap was
a search and seizure, and second that it was unreasonable, hence unconstitutional. Id. at
469-88.
6. 48 StAT. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1952).
7. 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952). "... [N]o person not being
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted com-
munication to any person. ..!'
8. The prohibition applies to both private persons, United States v. Gruber, 123
F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1941), and law enforcement officials, see text and notes at notes
13-14 infra.
9. Each party to an antiphonal telephone conversation is alternately the sender
and receiver, and therefore the party originating the call does not have the power to
surrender the other's privilege against interception of the message. United States
v. Stephenson, 121 F. Supp. 274 (D.D.C. 1954). See also United States v. Polakoff,
112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 653 (1940).
10. See generally Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Leg-
islative Proposal, 52 COLUM. L. Rmv. 165 (1952); Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire-
Tapping I, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 514 (1947) ; Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire-Tapping IV,
33 CoRNELL L.Q. 73 (1947).
11. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939); United States v. White, 228
F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1956).
12. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
13. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950) ; cert. denied, 342 U.S.
920 (1952) (interception by federal law enforcement officers).
14. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952) (dictum).
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unconstitutional search and seizure,1r federal courts, in determining whether
the federal act prohibits the admission of wire-tap evidence'6 in crim-
inal prosecutions, have generally reached the same results as have been
reached in the search and seizure cases. Evidence acquired as a re-
sult of an unreasonable search and seizure by federal officers is inadmis-
sible in a federal court regardless of the probative value of such evidence. 7
The basis of the rule '8 is deterrence of the practice by federal law enforce-
ment officers. 19 Similarly, evidence obtained by state authorities is also
excluded from federal courts where defendant can show collusion 20 or
participation on the part of federal officers.2 ' Even where the state officer
is acting independently but with the purpose of enforcing federal law,
admission of the evidence has been denied 2 in order to deter unconstitu-
tional enforcement of federal law.2a In dealing with wire-tap evidence
in federal courts, parallel reasoning has been utilized to exclude such
evidence when gathered by federal officers.4 Cases indicating federal-state
15. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942).
16. The term "wire-tap evidence" as used herein, except where otherwise indi-
cated, includes not only the actual conversation intercepted, but evidence obtained
as a result of using the information so obtained.
17. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (prohibited all use of such evidence) ; Nardone
v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
18. Exclusion is apparently a rule of evidence rather than a constitutional re-
quirement. See concurring opinion of Justice Black in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
39-40 (1949).
19. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). "If letters and private docu-
ments can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of
an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures is of no value, and . . . might as well be stricken
from the Constitution." Id. at 393. See United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499
(2d Cir. 1945): ". . . [E]xclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the con-
stitutional privilege. ... Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed." See
also Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41-46 (1949) (dissent) ; Note, Judicial Control of IllegalSearch
and Seizure, 58 YALE L.J. 144 (1948).
20. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 41(e), which incorporates
case law developed from the Weeks decision, see McComicx, EvIDENcE § 139 (1954),
provides in part as follows: "A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
may move ... to suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained .... The motion
shall be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the
defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion
may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing." See Fraenkel, Recent Developments
in the Federal Law of Searches and Seizures, 33 Iowa L. Rtv. 472, 488-89 (1948) ;
Comment, 28 TMxAs L. Rzv. 273 (1949). Normal procedure would require a person
making a motion to carry the burden of convincing the court that it should be granted.
21. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Lowrey v. United States, 128
F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1942).
22. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
23. Id. at 316.
24. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). In Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338 (1939), the Court further held that the use of wiretapping to obtain
other evidence was improper, and the evidence so obtained was inadmissible. See
Bernstein, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, 37 IL. L. RZv. 99 (1942); Note, Exch-
sion of Evidence Obtained by Wire-Tapping: An Ilhsory Safeguard, 61 YAIr L.J.
1221 (1952).
RECENT CASES
collaboration or a federal purpose on the part of a state officer have not yet
arisen.
With respect to the admission in state courts of evidence illegally ob-
tained by state officers, the Supreme Court has reached results contrary
to the federal search and seizure 25 and wire-tap evidence doctrines. In
Wolf v. Colorado,26 the Court affirmed a state conviction in which evidence
obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure 2 7 had been admitted.
In holding that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did
not require exclusion of the evidence, the Court indicated that the avail-
ability of local prosecutions and the pressure of public opinion relieved the
Court of the necessity of applying the drastic sanction of reversing other-
wise valid state convictions.28  In Schwartz v. Texas 29 -the Court again
expressed reluctance to interfere with state criminal proceedings, 30 holding
that .the Federal Communications Act did not prohibit admission in state
prosecutions of wire-tap evidence obtained by state officers.31 The strength
of the underlying search and seizure analogy was weakened, however, by
Rochin v. California 2 in which the Court reversed a state narcotics con-
viction based on evidence obtained by forcefully pumping the stomach of
the defendant.m3 But, the impact of the Rochin case, in turn, has been
lessened by the subsequent decision in Irvine v. California 4 where the
Court, divided 5-4,5 refused to reverse a state conviction based on evi-
dence obtained from a microphone concealed in defendant's bedroom,36
25. But see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
26. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
27. In view of the decision in the case, it was not necessary for the Court to find
the action by the state officers to have been an unconstitutional search and seizure.
Nevertheless, the Court did make such a finding. Id. at 33.
28. 338 U.S. at 32.
29. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
30. Id. at 202.
31. After this decision Texas enacted a law making inadmissable evidence ob-
tained in violation of the laws of the United States. Tx. Cons CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art.
727a (Supp. 1956).
32. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See Notes, 40 CA.w. L. Rev. 311, 66 HAnv. L. Rzv. 122,
50 MicH. L. Rzv. 1367 (1952). Cf. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
33. Decision cited with approval in McCoaxncK, EVmENcE § 141 (1954).
34. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
35. Four members of the Court concurred in distinguishing this case from Rochi
v. California on the ground that physical coercion was lacking and that therefore the
doctrine of Wolf v. Colorado applies. Id. at 133. Justice Clark, though disagreeing
with the result, reluctantly concurred in the judgment of the Court on the ground
that the Wolf doctrine was controlling. Id. at 138. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote
the majority opinion in Rochin, and three other members of the Court dissented on
the ground that the police activity in this case was of such a nature that the fourteenth
amendment required exclusion of the evidence.
36. Since the majority found the Wolf case controlling, see text and notes at notes
26-28 supra, it was not necessary to find that the practice was an unconstitutional
search and seizure. Cf. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (Defendant's
friend, in reality a secret government agent, entered defendant's place of business with
a microphone on his person. The ensuing conversation was transmitted to another
government agent stationed outside with a receiving set. The receiving agent testified
to the admissions of defendant that he had overheard. The Court held, four Justices
dissenting, that no unlawful search had been effected as there had been no trespass.
Id. at 751).
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a practice closely akin to wiretapping. Although existing law permits
the admission into federal courts of evidence acquired by state officials
through an unconstitutional search and seizure, if effected without the
collaboration of federal officers, the Supreme Court has not been presented
with an instance of a federal prosecution in which the evidence obtained
by a state officer resulted from an unreasonable search and seizure parallel-
ing those employed in either the Rochin or Irvine cases. The instant case
is the first to consider whether wire-tap evidence gathered by state officials
without federal purpose and without federal collaboration should be ad-
mitted in a federal prosecution.
Although the introduction of evidence obtained by unreasonable
searches and seizures on the part of state officers is permitted in the
federal courts in the absence of proof of collaboration by federal officers, 38
the impact of the Rochin case may require a re-evaluation of this rule. The
Wolf case expressed a willingness on the part of the Court to defer to
local sanctions and local public opinion as a restraint on unconstitutional
practices by state officials rather than to resort to a rule of exclusion that
would interfere with state determinations of its own rules of criminal
evidence.3 9 Yet the reversal of the conviction in Rochin indicates that
the Court will forego these considerations in dealing with certain police
practices that are more offensive than others, i.e., those that "shock the
conscience" 0 of the Court. Moreover, it is notable that the Court chose
to reverse even though the conduct involved-brutality to the person-
increased the probability of public clamor making prosecution of the
offending officers more likely. Having excluded from a state court evi-
dence obtained under the circumstances existing in the Rochin case, it
would seem an anomalous result were the Court then to admit the evidence
in a federal prosecution, were it turned over to federal authorities, par-
ticularly since the Court would not be constrained, as in Wolf, to interfere
with the evidentiary rules of a separate jurisdiction. Similar reasoning
would seem to suggest that if evidence obtained by the method disclosed in
the Irvine case, a situation closely analogous to wiretapping, were relayed
to a federal officer, it would not necessarily be admissible in a federal
prosecution even though the decision in Irvine uphed admission in a state
proceeding. 41 Thus, certain practices, amounting to unreasonable searches
and seizures, may not be considered dangerous or outrageous enough to
warrant an attempt to deter them at the expense of interference with state
procedures, whereas the removal of this impediment to judicial supervision
might well encourage application of the contrary rule of exclusion to these
same practices in federal courts. Such reasoning tends to undermine the
search and seizure doctrine relied on by the instant court. Moreover,
37. See text at notes 20-21 supra.
38. See notes 20-21 supra.
39. See notes 26-28 supra.
40. Rochin v. United States, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1951).
41. See note 35 supra.
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the contention, accepted by the instant court, that wiretapping is not an
unconstitutional search and seizure and that to exclude evidence obtained
by wiretapping is to apply in the instant case broader protection to a statu-
tory right than to a constitutional right 42 appears to be of doubtful validity.
This argument is premised on the idea that the constitutional right pro-
tects an interest more vital to the individual than the interest protected by
the statute. However, the Ohnstead case, which first established that
wiretapping was not unconstitutional, did not hold that it was a reasonable
police practice, but held rather that no search and seizure had taken place,4
there having been no trespass to the defendant's person or property. Sub-
sequent affirmances of this position have maintained this technical distinc-
tion.4 Furthermore, the existence of the statutory prohibition against
wiretapping relieves the Court of the necessity of re-examining the Olmstead
decision. Under these circumstances it would seem that the issue should
not be determined by adherence to a formalistic analogy not necessarily
grounded on substance.
However, other considerations militate against a result different from
that reached by the instant court. The evidence in question in the instant
case cannot be excluded on the ground that its admission constitutes an
illegal divulgence of the intercepted communication, since the communica-
tion itself was not introduced in the prosecution.45  Moreover, deterrence
of the practice of wiretapping by state officers is not likely to be achieved
by exclusion. The Court's past refusal to exclude from state prosecutions
wire-tap evidence gathered by state officials 46 would materially diminish
the impact of a rule of exclusion in the instant case. State officers still
would be free to utilize wire-tap evidence in state prosecutions without the
threat of local sanctions.47 Thus, an exclusionary rule would probably not
operate as a deterrent and would have the undesirable effect of denying
to federal authorities the use of probative evidence.
Another possible justification for a rule of exclusion would be its adop-
tion as a prophylactic measure to insure against federal-state collaboration
in securing violations of the statutory right. Although the burden of
showing collaboration has not yet been assigned in wire-tap cases, it seems
unlikely that it will fall upon the federal authorities. Such an assignment
would require proof by the Government of no collaboration, which if
rigidly applied would be an insurmountable burden and if applied less
42. See statement of Judge L. Hand in United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d
485, 490 (2d Cir. 1941), cited with approval in the instant case at 393.
43. See text and note at note 5 supra.
44. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942); cf. On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
45. See pp. 314-15 supra.
46. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
47. New York has a statute permitting police wire-tapping. See note 1 supra. The
number of convictions obtained under the criminal provisions of the Federal Com-
munications Act is conspicuous by their absence from reported decisions. See Rosen-
zweig, The Law of Wire-Tapping I, 32 CoaMi n L.Q. 514, 533 (1947), citing United
States v. Gruber, 123 F2d 307 (2d Cir. 1941).
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rigorously could be satisfied by a denial. On the other hand, assignment
of the burden of showing collaboration to the person against whom the
evidence is being used requires him to prove something that could not
reasonably be expected to be within his knowledge. Nevertheless, in the
search and seizure cases the burden has been assigned to the defendant.4
Yet, in the area of wire-tap evidence the secretive nature of the practice
indicates that discovery of the wire-tap itself may be highly unlikely,
thereby precluding any inquiry into the parties responsible for it. Despite
the difficulties inherent in the defendant's position, the inauguration of the
drastic sanction of a prophylactic rule, with its attendant denial of probative
evidence, would seem inappropriate without a demonstration that federal-
state collaboration in obtaining wire-tap evidence exists to any appreciable
degree.
The aforementioned considerations support the result reached by the
instant court, even though the precedent value of the search and seizure
analogy may be somewhat weakened by the Rochin case.4 9 Until such
time as the Court is willing to re-examine the Schwartz case in the light
of the danger to society from such an interference with individual privacy,
the result in the instant case appears sound.
48. See note 20 supra. The issue of collaboration between federal and state offi-
cers has not yet been presented in a case involving wiretapping. The facts of the
instant case indicate that none was present in the instant case. See pp. 314-15 rupra.
49. See text and notes at notes 38-41 supra.
